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Abstract
We explore the strategic value of quantity forcing contracts in a manufacturer-
retailer environment under both adverse selection and moral hazard. Manufacturers
dealing with (exclusive) competing retailers may prefer to leave contracts silent on
retail prices, whenever other aspects of the retailers’ activity remain nonverifiable.
Two effects are at play when moving from retail price maintenance to quantity forc-
ing. First, restricting screening possibilities may increase retailers’ rent. Second,
such restriction affects downstream competition. This latter effect may justify us-
ing quantity forcing contracts and, more generally, shed light on a novel source of
contractual incompleteness.
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1 Introduction
Common wisdom suggests that optimal contracts should limit as much as possible agents’
discretion within agency relationships. Principals should then profitably exploit all avail-
able screening and monitoring instruments in order to prevent agents’ misbehavior. Nev-
ertheless, contractual rules seldom display such high degree of complexity. In practice,
contracts appear rather simple and, more strikingly, quite often fail to specify verifiable
obligations of the parties.
Arm’s length relationships are widespread business practices. An archetypal example,
which we study in this paper, is provided by manufacturer-retailer relationships. Partic-
ular emphasis has indeed been put forward by the recent IO literature on the very in-
complete nature of contracts regulating trade between vertically related firms:1 not only
manufacturers often delegate marketing activities to retailers, but they also frequently
give up vertical control, by refusing to impose contractual restraints that would reduce
agency costs and, in turn, potentially improve upon allocative efficiency.2
What is the source of contract incompleteness in these markets? Taking a broader
perspective, existing agency models have provided few rationales for why contracts are
incomplete. One line of thoughts, for instance, has appealed to unforeseen contingencies,
and costs of writing and enforcing contracts (see Jean Tirole, 1999). But this body of
work is usually silent on the strategic value that competition may confer to arrangements
that seem too simple or incomplete.
Our paper has two main goals. First, we shed new light on the benefits for manufac-
turers to forego the contracting ability on retail prices and prefer simpler (less complete)
quantity forcing contracts. We offer a new rationale for the widespread use of simple
contracts in vertical relationships and account for a hitherto neglected link between down-
stream externalities and contractual design in such markets. Second, we derive implica-
tions of our analysis for the wider theoretical debate over contract incompleteness, and
show how our results complement existing models.
We frame the analysis in a manufacturer-retailer context, which allows for both ad-
verse selection and moral hazard. In this specific setting our objective is to investigate
the extent to which simple quantity forcing contracts can be strategically used by man-
ufacturers and preferred to more complete arrangements based on retail price control.
Moving from the standard sequential monopolies framework to games where the retail
market is ‘imperfectly competitive’, the choice of less complete contracts, like quantity
forcing arrangements, results from the interplay between the agency costs associated to
alternative incentive schemes and the externalities that competing retailers exert on each
other. We show that when some aspects of the retailers’ downstream activities are non-
verifiable, foregoing the opportunity to contract on retail prices might have a strategic
value.
1The applied literature on this topic (Francine Lafontaine and Margaret Slade, 1997, among many
others) has recently argued that the empirical evidence, fairly consistent across industries and firms, quite
often appears to be inconsistent with some aspects of the theoretical predictions based on agency theory.
2There are many other examples of incomplete contracts. Managerial contracts are typically vague
or silent on the competitive and organizational objectives that managers should pursue; lenders usually
leave entrepreneurs free to perform certain tasks that affect the profitability of their ventures; insurance
companies monitor only to a limited extent the behavior of insurees, to name only a few.
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To make this point as clear as possible for our purpose, consider a one-sided hierar-
chy model where two downstream retailers compete by setting quantities, and assume
that while one of these (hereafter the agent) deals with an exclusive upstream supplier
(the principal) to acquire an essential input for production, his competitor is vertically
integrated and has access to the input at no cost.3 Demands are uncertain and only down-
stream firms observe a payoff relevant signal before contracts are designed: an adverse
selection problem. Moreover, the non-integrated agent exerts a nonverifiable demand-
enhancing activity (effort) which may also affect the competitor’s demand: a moral hazard
issue.4 The manufacturer hires the retailer before production occurs, but after uncertainty
has realized, and he has all bargaining power in dictating the terms of trade.
Two alternative contractual regimes are compared: the principal can either commit
to a simple quantity forcing scheme (QF), or to a more sophisticated arrangement, com-
parable to resale price maintenance (RPM). These arrangements differ in their degree of
contractual completeness. Specifically, QF is more incomplete than RPM in the sense
that, beyond fixing the quantity supplied to final consumers, it leaves the downstream
agent free to choose its most preferred level of promotional effort. Instead, a RPM mech-
anism also restrains the retail price charged to final consumers in addition to fixing the
quantity supplied in the final market.
Two contrasting effects are at play once one moves from RPM to QF. On the one hand,
QF leaves more possibilities for the agent to enjoy an information rent because with such
a contract he appropriates a greater share of the return on improving own demand. On
the other hand, foregoing price control might have a strategic value for the principal. By
allowing his agent to respond more efficiently to competition, it can induce a favorable
behavior by the competing retailer at the market stage. Yet, while the former effect has
already been discussed in previous work,5 the second is novel.
The analysis provides simple conditions under which QF contracting may be pre-
ferred when retailers impose either positive or negative externalities on each other. To
understand this point, it is worthwhile observing that when downstream demands are
independent, that is retailers have monopolistic power in their own markets, RPM is
clearly preferred by the principal. Indeed, complete contracting provides more tools to
better extract the retailer’s private information on demand, whereby allowing to reach
a better trade-off between efficiency and rent extraction within this principal-agent pair.
Competition between retailers, though, brings a novel channel through which foregoing
retail price affects the supplier’s profit. By committing to leave his downstream agent free
to set some aspects of his performance, a manufacturer can influence in her own interest
the subsequent retail game.
The key feature of our environment is the link between market and non-market (ef-
3Allowing for a more symmetric framework with two competing hierarchies does not alter the main
insights of the one-sided hierarchy model that we analyze here (see Jakub Kastl, David Martimort and
Salvatore Piccolo, 2008).
4Distributors can indeed provide a wide range of services that affect demand. Free delivery, pre-sales
advices to potential buyers, show rooms, and after-sales services play a key role in enhancing demand.
Looking at supermarket data relative to the Chicago area, Judith A. Chevalier, Anil K. Kashyap and
Peter E. Rossi (2003) document the importance of retailers’ activity in price determination and the role
of the retailers’ advertising as a way of competing for customers.
5See Benjamin F. Blair and Tracy R. Lewis (1994), Esther Gal-Or (1991b) and Martimort and Piccolo
(2007) for instance.
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fort) externalities that downstream retailers impose on each other. We show that when
both kinds of externalities are negative (resp. positive), that is goods are substitutes
(resp. complements) and the retailer’s effort has a selfish (resp. cooperative) nature, the
principal strictly prefers a QF contract instead of the more complete RPM, provided that
information costs are not very large. Essentially, by inducing more effort on the agent’s
side, foregoing the ability to contract on prices shifts around the competitors’ equilibrium
output supply. This has a positive strategic effect as long as market and non-market ex-
ternalities have the same sign. By contrast, in a free-riding environment, which emerges
when goods are substitutes and efforts have a cooperative value, RPM is the best choice.
In this case, increasing the effort of the agent through the contractual channel is not
optimal as it makes downstream competitors more aggressive via the positive non-market
externality.
This result is fairly general and, although we have developed the formal arguments
in a stylized IO example, our conclusions are of wider scope. They can rationalize the
use of simple contracts basically within any competing hierarchies model involving ver-
tical and horizontal contractual externalities, be it procurement contracting, executive
compensations, patent licensing, insurance or credit relationships, to name only a few.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 lays out the model. Section 3 provides
the equilibrium characterization. Section 4 analyzes the strategic value of QF contracts.
Section 5 offers an overview of the related IO literature and comments the link between
our paper and the body of work on incomplete contracting. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
Players and environment: Consider a simple retail industry where two downstream
outlets, R1 and R2, producing symmetrically differentiated products compete by setting
quantities. The production of each of these final outputs requires an essential raw input
which is supplied at the upstream level. To make the analysis as sharp as possible for
our purpose, consider a one-sided hierarchy model and assume that, while R1 must deal
with an independent supplier S1 to secure the input, R2 is vertically integrated with his
own supplier S2 and produces as a unique entity, hereafter labeled S2-R2. As we shall see,
this simple structure already brings out clearly the relevant trade-offs that S1 faces when
choosing between QF and RPM.
The system of (inverse) market demands is defined by:
p1(θ, e1, q1, q2) = θ + e1 − q1 + ρq2, and p2(θ, e1, q2, q1) = θ + σe1 − q2 + ρq1.
where qi is the quantity produced of good i, pi is the retail price charged for this product,
and θ is a common shock affecting both demands. The demand parameter θ is uniformly
distributed on the compact support Θ = [θ, θ] (we denote ∆θ = θ¯ − θ > 0 and assume
that θ is large enough to maintain positive output and effort in all circumstances below).
The realization of θ is private information of retailers at the time contracts are signed,
and e1 denotes a non-observable demand-enhancing activity (effort) performed by retailer
R1.
6
6Neither S1 nor S2-A2 can observe e1.
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The effort variable is meant to capture any kind of non-market activity performed by
R1, such as production of indivisible services, investment in advertising or pre-sale advises
to potential buyers, that is not directly controlled by S1.
7 Such kind of effort has two
effects on the demand system. Clearly, it enhances own consumers’ willingness to pay,
but it may also influence the competitor’s demand. This assumption seems reasonable in
at least two cases. First, when effort is interpreted as production of indivisible services
bundled with the final product, it might have a negative impact on competitors’ demand
if goods are substitutes; and the opposite obtains for complements. Second, when effort
captures pre-sale services or generic advertising, it could well be the case that information
on the product’s existence benefits also competitors: a free-riding story (e.g., Mathewson
and Winter, 1984).
Following Yeon-Koo Che and Donald B. Hausch (1999), we distinguish these alterna-
tive scenarios depending on the effort value, which is cooperative for σ > 0, and selfish
otherwise. Throughout we shall assume that |σ| ≤ 1 in order to guarantee that own-
effort effects are larger than cross-effort ones, that is ∂p1(.)/∂e1 ≥ |∂p2(.)/∂e1|. Further-
more, ρ is an index for product differentiation. It also satisfies |ρ| ≤ 1 to ensure that
own-price effects are larger than cross-price ones in the direct demand system, that is
|∂qi(.)/∂pi| ≥ |∂qi(.)/∂p−i|. For expositional purposes, we focus on only two cases of
interest. In the first one, market and effort externalities have the same sign, that is, in
the parameter region where σρ > 0. The second relevant region of parameters is that
where σρ ≤ 0, with σ ≥ 0 and ρ ≤ 0, which describes a free-riding context.8
Exerting effort is costly and, for simplicity, we assume that the corresponding disutility
function for R1 is quadratic, namely Ψ(e1) = ψe
2
1/2.
9 Finally, we assume that both
upstream and downstream firms produce at constant marginal costs normalized to zero.
Incentive mechanisms: S1 can use two different classes of incentive mechanisms: RPM
or QF contracts. In each case, he offers menus of contracts to screen his retailer according
to the realization of demand.
Under QF, for instance, an incentive mechanism is a menu of contracts of the form{
t1(θˆ), q1(θˆ)
}
θˆ∈Θ
where θˆ is R1 ’s report on the demand parameter, q1(θˆ) is the corre-
sponding input level supplied by S1 and t1(θˆ) is the fixed-fee paid by R1 to S1.
Similarly, if RPM is chosen, an incentive mechanism is of form
{
t1(θˆ), q1(θˆ), p1(θˆ)
}
θˆ∈Θ
where now p1(θˆ) denotes the retail price of good 1 following report θˆ.
10
7As it will become clear later on, since S2-R2 is vertically integrated, there is no loss of insights in
assuming that R2 does not exert any effort.
8Assuming that goods are complements, ρ ≥ 0, and that effort creates negative externalities, σ ≤ 0,
seems unreasonable.
9In an earlier version, we made no assumption on disutility and on the distribution of types and get
all results below when assuming that uncertainty is small by means of Taylor expansions.
10In our environment this is without loss of generality. Indeed, when S1 no longer controls the level of
final output sold in the market, but can only fix the retail price under RPM, the analysis remains the same
as if output was observable. The argument is formally developed in Martimort and Piccolo (2007). The
idea is that, for screening purposes, the optimal RPM mechanism reduces the input supply below what
would be optimal under complete information. Indeed, consider the output choice of the non-integrated
retailer when final output is non-verifiable. Since his objective is similar to that of an integrated structure
under complete information, the retailer would like to expand output up to the point where the marginal
benefit of one extra unit (the retail price) equals the marginal disutility of effort. Thus R1 would like to
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A QF arrangement is less complete relative to RPM because it restricts the set of
screening instruments available to the manufacturer by leaving unspecified the retail price.
Therefore, QF arrangements amount to a vertically decentralized organizational structure.
With such contractual scheme, the upstream manufacturer does not have enough instru-
ments to monitor the promotional effort exerted by the retailer. Instead, by dictating the
retail price and the quantity sold to the retailer, the upstream manufacturer is able to
control directly the retailer’s effort level under RPM.
Note that even a RPM arrangement is an incomplete contract. Indeed, manufacturer
S1 cannot contract on the output and retail price chosen by S2-R2. This assumption de
facto rules out any “grand-contract” based on all information available downstream. It
is justified either because such contracts are generally viewed as collusive practices by
antitrust authorities, or because communication between a manufacturer and a retailer
selling a competing product is not even feasible.
Contracts are secret and, following Roger Myerson (1982) and David Martimort (1996),
we use a version of the Revelation Principle in competing hierarchies to characterize the
set of incentive feasible allocations. Indeed, with secret contracts, for any output chosen
by the integrated structure S2-R2, there is no loss of generality in looking for S1’s best
response within the class of direct and truthful mechanisms to characterize pure strategy
equilibria.
Commitment to vertical restraints: Since the mechanism ruling the hierarchy S1-R1
is private, it cannot have any commitment value vis-a`-vis the vertically integrated struc-
ture S2-R2. This seems a quite natural assumption in environments where details of the
vertical deals between a manufacturer and his retailer are rarely available to competitors.
However, the choice of the specific contractual mode, namely whether quantity forcing
(QF) or resale price maintenance (RPM) is chosen by a given manufacturer, is itself
observable by competing hierarchies. This commitment assumption plays a central role
in our analysis and deserves some motivation.
The key issue is whether principals can credibly commit not to exert vertical price
control. In practice, in OECD countries where exemptions to RPM practices are admitted,
manufacturers are requested to ask Antitrust authorities to use these contracts and this
move is publicly observable.11
More generally, there are other ways by which suppliers can commit themselves to
choose a particular kind of vertical arrangements.
First, the observability of retail prices might require setting up some (observable)
monitoring technology in advance, especially in cases where retailers may include either
nonverifiable elements or secret price cuts with their customers. Not acquiring such tech-
nology at the outset makes gathering information on retail prices impossible afterwards.12
expand output above the second-best level implemented by our mechanism {t1(.), q1(.), p1(.)} irrespective
of the sign of σρ. This implies that there is no incentives to sell a quantity lower than that supplied by
the manufacturer and shows that our mechanism is robust to the lack of verifiability of the final output
sold by the retailers. Including this quantity as an explicit contracting variables facilitates presentation.
11RPM is generally prohibited in almost all OECD countries. Some countries though do have a proce-
dure for authorizing this practice if the beneficial effects can be shown to outweigh the detrimental ones.
See, for example, Alan E. Bollard (1989) as for New Zealand. Firms wishing to justify RPM, it is argued,
should be asked to demonstrate the efficiency gains they claim rather than using scarce competition
authority resources to establish the inefficiency of each system.
12In this respect, consider a simple extension of our model with several downstream retailers dealing
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Second, even if the retail price is easily observable, suppliers may build reputation for
not using it as a contractual variable. Thus, commitment to QF leaves more freedom to
downstream retailers and this may have also a positive feed-back in fostering downstream
investments and initiative. In this respect, our model can also be viewed as a short-
cut for a slightly more complex setting where not only retail prices and quantities may
be contractually specified but also other input requirements. Freeing the agent from any
control of those activities may have the same commitment value as giving up price control
in our simplified model.
Third, a simple legal instrument, commonly used in business practices, which makes
this commitment credible is to stipulate very high penalties for breaching any announced
contractual mode.13
Timing, strategies and equilibrium concept: Firms play a three-stage game whose
sequence of events unfolds as follows:
1. S1 either publicly commits to verify the (ex post) realization of the retail price in
market-1 (RPM), together with R1’s sales level or, alternatively, she might give up vertical
control and use only sales as a screening device (QF).
2. Uncertainty about demand realizes and only R1 and S2-R2 observe it.
3. S1 secretly offers a menu of contracts of the chosen class to R1. Once this menu has
been accepted, R1 picks one element within that menu by sending a message θˆ1 ∈ Θ to
S1 about the realized demand state. Effort is exerted, product market competition takes
place and, finally, payments are made after verifiable actions have been observed. If the
offer is turned down, S1 and R1 enjoy their outside options which are normalized to zero,
and the integrated structure S2-R2 acts as a monopolist in the downstream market.
The equilibrium concept we use is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium with the added “pas-
sive beliefs” refinement. Provided R1 receives any unexpected offer from S1, he still
believes that S2-R2 produces the same equilibrium quantity. We denote by G the three
stage game of contractual choices cum mechanisms offers and market interactions. We
shall look for equilibria in pure strategies of G.
Our analysis will be developed under the following assumption on parameter values:14
(A1)
ψ > max
{
1
2
,
2 + σρ
4− 2ρ(σ + ρ) ,
1 + σρ
2− ρ2
}
. (1)
As we will show below, there always exists a unique linear equilibrium of G as long as
the distribution on demand shocks is uniform, the effort disutility is quadratic and inverse
with the same manufacturer and suppose that those retailers observe each other retail prices. A com-
mitment to have exclusive territories may act as a device not to learn retail prices whereas intrabrand
downstream competition between retailers may help revealing this information. Such commitment to
choose either exclusive territories or instead intrabrand competition is certainly observable and credible.
Patrick Rey and Joseph Stiglitz (1995) analyzed the commitment role of exclusive territories although in
a model with public contracts.
13Of course, this argument is valid as long as nothing unexpected ever occurs.
14In the Appendix, we show that this assumption allows us to focus on fully separating allocations
whatever the contractual arrangement under scrutiny.
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demands are linear as supposed. In such linear equilibria, efforts and quantities depend
linearly on the demand shock θ.15
Complete information benchmark: For each realization of θ and any effort-output
pair {e1(θ), q1(θ)}θ∈Θ implemented by S1, the vertically integrated structure S2-R2 solves:
q2(θ) = argmax
q2∈R+
p2(θ, e1(θ), q2, q1(θ))q2 =
1
2
(θ + ρq1(θ) + σe1(θ)). (2)
Under complete information, the vertical structure S1-R1’s maximizes at each θ its verti-
cally integrated profit:
(e1(θ), q1(θ)) = argmax
(e1,q1)∈R2+
{p1(θ, e1, q1, q2(θ))q1 −Ψ(e1)} . (3)
which leads to the following first-order conditions:
q1(θ) =
1
2
(θ + ρq2(θ) + e1(θ)) and q1(θ) = ψe1(θ). (4)
Solving equations (2) and (4) gives us the Nash equilibrium outputs and effort under
complete information. For each θ let us denote by {p∗1(θ), q∗1(θ), e∗1(θ)} the solution to the
following equations:
q∗1(θ) =
(2 + ρ)ψθ
ψ(4− ρ2)− 2− ρσ , q
∗
1(θ) = ψe
∗
1(θ), p
∗
1(θ) = q
∗
1(θ).
These are respectively the quantity, downstream level of effort and retail price for each
realization of demand that S1 would recommend to R1 to maximize the profit of their
vertical structure in a Nash equilibrium with the integrated hierarchy S2 −R2.
Under complete information, the marginal cost of effort must be equal to own market
sales which means that the retailer’s choice of effort is aligned with that of the vertical
structure he forms with the upstream manufacturer. Because there is no vertical exter-
nality under complete information, the effort level will be the same whether S1 allows R1
to choose his downstream effort or impose it through a secret contract. There is no way
of affecting downstream competition. QF and RPM both implement the same outcome.
This is no longer the case under asymmetric information since it induces a vertical exter-
nality. The agent’s choice of effort is no longer aligned with that of his principal and the
latter can use this conflict strategically to influence downstream competition.
3 Equilibrium characterization
Downstream moral hazard has generally two different effects in games of competing hier-
archies. First, it will create an agency problem in the vertical structure even under RPM.
Second, effort in enhancing own demand may have an impact on competitor’s demand.
RPM and QF may affect differently the demand faced by competing retailers and thus
have a strategic value. In this framework, neither RPM nor QF allows S1 to fully extract
15On that existence, see also Martimort (1996) who studied a related model (although without effort).
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R1’s information rents since, even when the retail price can be contracted upon, S1 cannot
disentangle the impact of the intercept parameter θ and the retailer’s effort on the residual
demand the latter faces. The possibility for the retailer to claim that large sales are due
to a high effort level and a lower demand than what he has really observed, whereas they
result instead from a higher demand and less effort, forces the upstream manufacturer to
give up some information rent to high-demand retailers in order to induce truthtelling.
As a result, the second-best allocation will be characterized by a downward distortion of
both quantity and effort supplied by the retailer when he faces low demand states. This
information rent, of course, depends on the chosen contractual mode.
In particular, the choice of the contractual mode has two opposite effects on S1’s profits
whenever R1’s effort and output have the same impact on S2-R2’s demand, namely ρσ > 0.
On the one hand, restricting the set of screening instruments may lead the upstream
supplier to grant more information rents relative to RPM: an agency cost effect. On the
other hand, by changing the rivals’ behavior at the market stage, QF may also have a
strategic value relative to RPM: a strategic effect. The relative strength of these two
effects will depend upon the severity of the agency problem.
As we shall prove, when demand uncertainty is small enough, the strategic effect
dominates the agency one. Besides creating a vertical externality between S1 and R1
because, under asymmetric information, S1 wants less downstream effort than what R1
would like to exert, QF also generates an horizontal externality which may drive the
integrated structure S2-R2 to behave in a more friendly manner. By contrast, in the free-
riding set-up, the oversupply of effort provided by R1 under QF makes his competitor
more aggressive at the market stage so as to make the strategic effect reinforce the agency
effect. QF is thus always dominated by RPM.
Below we solve the game in two steps. First, we characterize the market allocation
under both contractual regimes. Then, the equilibrium contract will be derived by using
a backward induction argument.
Note that S2-R2’s best-response is still given by equation (2), i.e.,
q2(θ) = argmax
q2∈R+
p2(θ, e1(θ), q2, q1(θ))q2 =
1
2
(θ + ρq1(θ) + σe1(θ)).
One can already infer that S1 has an incentive to choose strategically the contractual
mode to influence S2-R2’s behavior. By choosing QF, S1 commits to let R1 choose freely
the demand-enhancing effort e1. Because the retailer better internalizes the impact of
his effort on his own demand, QF shifts e1 up.
16 When goods are complements (ρ > 0),
shifting the S2-R2’s reaction function up has a positive strategic effect when efforts have a
cooperative value (σ > 0). Instead, when effort is selfish (σ < 0) and goods are substitutes
(ρ < 0), shifting that reaction function down is certainly the best option.
RPM: In this regime S1 can contract also on the retail price beside the quantity supplied
by the downstream firm to final consumers. The effort level is then indirectly fixed as a
function of θ through the inverse demand, i.e., e1 = p1 + q1 − ρq2 − θ. Intuitively, RPM
is less flexible than QF simply because, when the retailer faces a retail price target, he is
16Everything else being kept constant.
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forced to choose a suboptimal effort level from his viewpoint.17
Let us define R1’s information rent as:
U1(θ) = p1(θ)q1(θ)−Ψ(p1(θ) + q1(θ)− ρq2(θ)− θ)− t1(θ).
Incentive compatibility implies:
U1(θ) = max
θˆ∈Θ
{
p1(θˆ)q1(θˆ)−Ψ(p1(θˆ) + q1(θˆ)− ρq2(θ)− θ)− t1(θˆ)
}
.
This yields the following first- and second-order local conditions for incentive compatibil-
ity:18
U˙1 (θ) = (1 + ρq˙2(θ))ψe1(θ), (5)
and
(p˙1(θ) + q˙1(θ))(1 + ρq˙2(θ)) ≥ 0, (6)
which, together with the participation constraint
U1 (θ) ≥ 0, (7)
define the set of incentive feasible allocations in S1-R1 hierarchy for a fixed output schedule
q2(θ) chosen by the rival pair S2-R2.
S1’s problem (PP ) is to design a menu of contracts to maximize the expected franchise
fee he receives from R1 subject to participation and incentive compatibility constraints,
together with the additional restriction required by the retail price target. Expressing the
fixed fee t1(θ) as a function of the retailer’s revenue and information rent, (PP ) becomes
(PP ) : max
{U1(·), q1(·), e1(·)}
∫ θ
θ
{
(θ + e1(θ) + ρq2(θ)− q1(θ))q1(θ)− ψe
2
1(θ)
2
− U1(θ)
}
dθ
subject to (5), (6) and (7).
We will first assume and check ex post that 1 + ρq˙2(θ) ≥ 0 for all θ. Then U1(θ) is
increasing and the retailer’s participation constraint (7) binds only for the lowest level of
demand θ. We obtain immediately:
U1(θ) =
∫ θ
θ
(1 + ρq˙2(x))ψe1(x)dx.
Using this expression to compute the expected rent left to R1, inserting into the
maximand of S1’s problem, integrating by parts and neglecting (6) (that will be checked
ex post also) yields a relaxed optimization problem (PP ′):
max
{q1(·), e1(·)}
∫ θ
θ
{
(θ + e1(θ)− q1(θ) + ρq2(θ))q1(θ)− ψe
2
1(θ)
2
− (θ¯ − θ)(1 + ρq˙2(θ))ψe1(θ)
}
dθ.
17Under retail price restrictions the upstream producer has full control of all available instruments. See
also Blair and Lewis (1994) and Martimort and Piccolo (2007) for related analysis.
18In the Appendix, we show that those local conditions are also sufficient for global optimality of the
truthtelling strategy.
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At a best-response to the schedule q2(θ) implemented by the competing pair S2-R2, the
production and effort in S1-R1 hierarchy are respectively given by the following first-order
conditions obtained by pointwise optimization:19
q1(θ) = p1(θ) = θ + e1(θ) + ρq2(θ)− q1(θ), (8)
q1(θ) = ψ
(
e1(θ) + (θ¯ − θ)(1 + ρq˙2(θ))
)
. (9)
Under RPM, the only variable which is really useful to reduce R1’s information rent
is his own effort as it can be seen on (5). Hence, this effort level needs to be downward
distorted relative to its complete information level. At the same time, the pricing rule
is unchanged and keeps the same expression as under complete information as seen from
(8). Output is produced according to the efficient rule conditionally on a given effort but
this effort is distorted downward under asymmetric information.20
By using (2) together with (8) and (9), one can check that the allocation
{
eP1 (θ), q
P
1 (θ)
}
θ∈Θ
solves the following system of differential equations:
q˙P1 (θ) =
2(qP1 (θ)− ψeP1 (θ))− (θ¯ − θ)ψ(2 + ρ(1 + σe˙P1 (θ)))
ρ2(θ¯ − θ)ψ , (10)
eP1 (θ) =
(4− ρ2)qP1 (θ)− (2 + ρ)θ
2 + ρσ
, (11)
with the boundary conditions qP1 (θ) = q
∗
1(θ) and e
P
1 (θ) = e
∗
1(θ).
In the Appendix, we show that, underA1, the equilibrium output is always downwards
distorted. More precisely, the ability of a retailer to pretend having observed a slightly
lower level of demand forces the supplier to give up a rent in order to elicit information
revelation. To reduce this costly rent, the supplier reduces effort below its complete
information level. Although sales are not used for rent extraction purposes, output itself
has to fall below its complete information level because effort is downward distorted, but
this effect is indirect only.
QF: Now S1 no longer contracts on the retail price, but she still observes and contracts
on the quantity supplied by R1 on the retail market.
Let us now redefine retailer R1’s information rent under a QF regime as:
U1(θ) = −t1(θ) + max
e1∈R+
(θ + e1 − q1(θ) + ρq2(θ))q1(θ)−Ψ(e1) .
Incentive compatibility implies now:21
U1(θ) = max
θˆ∈Θ
{
−t1(θˆ) + max
e1∈R+
(θ + e1 − q1(θˆ) + ρq2(θ))q1(θˆ)−Ψ(e1)
}
.
From which we obtain the following first- and second-order local conditions for incentive
compatibility:
U˙1(θ) = (1 + ρq˙2(θ))q1(θ), (12)
19Given concavity of the objective, these conditions are also sufficient.
20This is reminiscent of the so-called ‘dichotomy’ between pricing rule and incentives found in a regu-
latory environment with a single hierarchy (Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole, 1993, Ch. 3).
21Again, those local conditions are proved to be sufficient also in the Appendix.
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(1 + ρq˙2(θ))q˙1(θ) ≥ 0. (13)
Finally, because the agent is residual claimant for any impact of his demand-enhancing
effort under a QF arrangement, we have:
q1(θ) = ψe1(θ). (14)
Taking into account this latter expression of R1’s effort, S1’s contracting problem can
be written as:
(PQ) : max
{U1(·),q1(·)}
∫ θ
θ
{(
θ +
q1(θ)
ψ
+ ρq2(θ)− q1(θ)
)
q1(θ)− q
2
1(θ)
2ψ
− U1(θ)
}
dθ,
subject to (12), (13) and (7).
For any given quantity schedule specified by the direct revelation mechanism QF, R1
gains flexibility under a quantity-fixing arrangement since he chooses now optimally his
effort level. More specifically, while choosing the optimal effort level, the retailer does
not internalize the impact of his effort on the information rent given up by the upstream
manufacturer. QF introduces a vertical externality between the manufacturer and his
retailer. As rents and effort are positively related via quantity, it will be thus profitable
to oversupply effort relative to RPM everything else being kept equal.
We again first assume and check ex post that 1 + ρq˙2(θ) ≥ 0 for all θ. Then U1(θ) is
increasing and the participation constraint binds at θ only. We obtain immediately:
U1(θ) =
∫ θ
θ
(1 + ρq˙2(x))q1(x)dx.
Using this expression to compute the expected rent left to R1, integrating by parts and
inserting into the maximand of (PQ) yields the expression of the relaxed program (PQ′):
max
{q1(·)}
∫ θ
θ
{(
θ +
q1(θ)
ψ
+ ρq2(θ)− q1(θ)
)
q1(θ)− q
2
1(θ)
2ψ
− (θ¯ − θ)(1 + ρq˙2(θ))q1(θ)
}
dθ.
At a best-response to the schedule q2(θ) implemented by the pair S2-R2, we get:
θ +
qQ1 (θ))
ψ
− 2qQ1 (θ) + ρqQ2 (θ)− (θ¯ − θ)(1 + ρq˙Q2 (θ)) = 0. (15)
Differentiating equation (2) yields 2q˙Q2 (θ) = 1 + ρq˙
Q
1 (θ) + σe˙
Q
1 (θ), using this condition
together with ψe˙Q1 (θ) = q˙
Q
1 (θ), one can immediately show that q
Q
1 (θ) solves the following
differential equation:
q˙Q1 (θ) =
ψ(2 + ρ)(2θ − θ¯) + (2 + ρσ − ψ(4− ρ2))qQ1 (θ)
ρ(θ¯ − θ)(σ + ψρ) , (16)
with the boundary condition qQ1 (θ) = q
∗
1(θ).
Under QF, S1 gives up a screening instrument by not controlling the retail price.
The only remaining screening device is output which must be downward distorted for
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rent extraction reasons. Contrary to the case of RPM, the pricing rule is now distorted
compared with the complete information and the RPM cases.
Once again, the ability of a retailer having observed a given shock on demand to
pretend demand was slightly lower forces the supplier to give up a costly information
rent. Reducing this rent requires a downward distortion of the output level below its
complete information level, i.e., qQ1 (θ) < q
∗
1(θ) for all θ < θ. Moreover, although effort is
now chosen efficiently by the retailer, the fact that sales are downward distorted implies
that the effort itself falls below its first-best level, but this effect is again indirect only.
4 The strategic value of incomplete contracts
Having characterized the market allocation under both contractual regimes, we now turn
to investigate whether RPM or QF is the preferred contractual mode at equilibrium. As
a preliminary result, the next Proposition provides a useful description of how outputs
and efforts are ordered under both regimes. This result will be key for showing, as well
as interpreting, the equilibrium characterization provided below.
Proposition 1 Assume that A1 holds.The following properties are satisfied:
• eQ1 (θ) ≥ eP1 (θ) for all θ with equality holding only at θ;
• qQ2 (θ) ≥ qP2 (θ) for all θ with equality only at θ (resp. ≤) if and only if σ > 0 (resp.
<);
• qQ1 (θ) ≥ qP1 (θ) for all θ with equality only at θ (resp. ≤) if and only if ρσ > 0 (resp.
<).
When the upstream manufacturer gives up control on retail price, the downstream
firm increases his information rent by playing on his effort choice. Under QF, R1 chooses
his effort according to the efficient rule (14). Thus, R1 finds it profitable to supply more
effort under a QF contract relative to RPM in order to enjoy more rent. Hence eQ1 (θ)
must be larger than eP1 (θ). This difference in efforts shifts in turn the reaction function
of the competing integrated structure when moving from RPM to QF. From equation (2)
it is easy to check that, when σ > 0, the output level q2(θ) increases with such a move,
and it diminishes otherwise. This explains why besides introducing a vertical externality
between S1 and R1, QF also creates an horizontal externality on the integrated structure
S2-R2, so that q
Q
2 (θ) is larger than q
P
2 (θ) when σ > 0, and lower when σ < 0.
Finally, as for q1(θ), three different effects are at play simultaneously by moving from
RPM to QF. First, for any given output level, R1 will exert more effort under QF relative
to RPM. When the retail price is not controlled, the agent is residual claimant for the full
impact of his effort on enhancing demand. This effect raises effort and thus R1’s output:
a demand-enhancing effect. Second, since sales are the only screening instrument under
QF, S1 needs to distort it downward for rent extraction reasons: a rent extraction effect.
Third, owing to the horizontal externality, the output of the competing structure S2-R2
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is shifted upward when goods are substitutes and downward when they are complements:
a strategic effect.22
Yet, when products are differentiated and efforts generate demand spillovers, the
strategic effect gets stronger when market and effort externalities have the same sign,
that is ρσ > 0. In this case, QF increases effort and moves q2(θ) in the right direction.
By contrast, in the free-riding case the strategic effect leads the integrated structure S2-
R2 to behave more aggressively at the market stage since the consumers’ willingness to
pay increases and q2(θ) increases. This in turn lowers q1(·) when quantities are strategic
substitutes.
Armed with this characterization, we can now show the main result of the paper. In
the next theorem we provide conditions, related to the presence of externalities between
agents, under which QF has a strategic value relative to RPM.
Theorem 1 Assume that A1 holds. Then, as long as ∆θ is small enough, S1 prefers QF
if ρσ > 0, and RPM when ρσ ≤ 0.
The economic intuition of this result is simple and builds upon the insights provided
by Proposition 1. By inducing more effort on the retailer’s side, QF changes also the
market behavior of the competing structure. Of course, once one moves from RPM to
QF, information rents increase because a screening instrument is given up: an agency cost
effect. When goods are independent or effort does not create any horizontal externalities
between retailers, this agency cost leads the upstream supplier to always prefer RPM.
If, instead, goods are differentiated and there are effort spillovers, the strategic effect
may outweigh the extra agency costs associated to QF whenever market and non-market
externalities have the same sign and the cost of asymmetric information is not very large,
that is ∆θ is small.
In fact, as QF allows S1 to force S2-R2 to behave in a more friendly manner at the
market stage, it raises the supplier’s profits by increasing effort and so the expected
transfer that can be extracted from R1. In the free-riding case, though, the strategic
effect has a negative value as QF makes S2-R2 more aggressive relative to RPM. This
adds to the excessive agency costs effect and thus leads S1 to prefer RPM.
Remark 1: It is important to notice that the insight delivered by Theorem 1 extends
directly to a more general framework with two (symmetric) competing hierarchies (see
Kastl, Martimort and Piccolo, 2008). Both the agency cost effect and the strategic effect
illustrated above survive in such a model, and are key to show that choosing QF is an
equilibrium of the game in the limit of small uncertainty whenever σρ > 0. Indeed, a
QF contract still leaves more possibilities for the agent to grasp information rent, but for
any given class of mechanisms ruling the competing hierarchy, restricting the set of the
screening instruments available to a principal may create a strategic effect influencing the
rival’s market behavior. As before, the vertical externality that QF creates within each
vertical hierarchy is translated horizontally on the competing organization. Increasing
22When efforts do not create externalities, σ = 0, or goods are independent, ρ = 0, the latter strategic
effect is absent. The demand-enhancing and the rent extraction effects then exactly compensate in our
quadratic framework, that is qQ1 (θ) = q
P
1 (θ). As a consequence, the competing hierarchies framework at
hand displays the same features as the sequential monopolies model studied in Martimort and Piccolo
(2007).
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retailers’ effort thus provides a beneficial effect on supplier’s profits to the extent that it
weakens the competitive stance of the opposing hierarchy on the downstream market.
Remark 2: It is worth closing this Section with a general comment on our methodology.
It could be argued that the simple result that less complete contracts could have a strate-
gic value can be obtained in a simpler complete information model. Consider the case
where demand is common knowledge and S1 either uses a two-part tariff or a linear whole-
sale price. Two-part tariffs imply fierce downstream competition. Linear prices commit
instead the retailer to decrease his output downstream, which may have a positive effect in
the case of demand complements or price competition.23 However, linear pricing performs
badly in shifting profits upstream so that part of the strategic gains of using them cannot
be recouped upstream. The methodological issue is that, under complete information,
there is no reason a priori to restrict the use of fixed-fees as a mean of extracting the
retailer’s downstream profit. Asymmetric information, instead, endogenizes the limits on
the ability of upstream manufacturer to capture downstream profit and provides better
foundations for the possible restrictions on instruments associated to different vertical
restraints.
5 Related literature
Our paper belongs to three strands of literature with some overlap: the literature on the
strategic design of incomplete contracts, the literature on vertical restraints, and lastly
the literature on strategic delegation.
Strategic design of incomplete contracts: The idea that, in a strategic situation,
reducing a player’s set of actions or allowing him to commit to suboptimal actions may
increase his payoff has already been studied. In the incomplete contracts literature, this
insight leads to show that “more incompleteness” may help to improve contractual out-
comes. To date, the literature has shown that it can be done either by relaxing dynamic
incentive constraints or because it facilitates signalling of private information.
Concerning the role of incompleteness in dynamic environments, Mathias Dewatripont
and Eric Maskin (1990, 1995) and Jacques Cre´mer (1995) showed that a principal might
voluntarily limit the set of variables used to contract with his agent to relax renegotiation
constraints.24 Klaus M. Schmidt and Monika Schnitzer (1995), Douglas B. Bernheim and
Michael D. Whinston (1998) and David Pearce and Ennio Stacchetti (1998) analyzed
complete information models where nonverifiable actions can only be enforced through
repeated interactions. Writing less complete contracts may relax incentive constraints in
those repeated games.
Philippe Aghion and Benjamin Hermalin (1990), Franklin Allen and Douglas Gale
(1992) and Kathryn Spier (1992) stressed the signalling value of incomplete contracts.
When contracts can only be signed once principals are informed, incompleteness may
23A related effect is actually at work in Rey and Stiglitz (1995) although the commitment to increase
retail prices comes there from the choice of exclusive territories for the retailers of the same manufacturer.
24Olsen and Torsvik (1993) and Martimort (1999) demonstrated also how moving away from a cen-
tralized regulation by introducing competing regulators, another form of incompleteness, may improve
intertemporal commitment.
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be profitably used by a privately informed principal to credibly convey information to
agents.25
The strategic value of incomplete contracts stressed in our paper is novel and different
from those above. The bilateral contract between a principal and his agent in a given
hierarchy does not exert any externality on their selves as in a dynamic context but instead
on competing retailers in a static game.
Vertical restraints: Our analysis is also related to the literature on vertical restraints
under informational asymmetries (Piccolo et al., 2008, Gal-Or, 1991a, 1991b, 1991c,
1991d, 1999, Martimort, 1996, and Rey and Tirole, 1986, among others). While these
previous contributions have mainly taken the set of control instruments available to a
manufacturer as given, we endogenize this set in a strategic context.26 From an organi-
zational design viewpoint, our results also explain why upstream manufacturers delegate
non-market decisions, such as advertising and marketing activities, to downstream retail-
ers (Lafontaine and Slade, 1997, and Andrea Sheppard, 1993).
Closer in spirit to our work, Bernard Caillaud and Patrick Rey (1995) started in-
vestigating information structures in producers-retailers hierarchies. Ignorance on the
retailer’s cost function might create a strategic advantage that could outweigh the as-
sociated agency costs. They focused on the value of ignorance in environments where
principals can choose whether to acquire (at no additional costs) all the relevant market
information or, alternatively, to stay (strategically) uninformed. In our set-up full extrac-
tion is prevented by a moral hazard component on non-market activities. This assumption
is key for equilibria to display the less complete QF arrangements.
Strategic delegation: Our analysis also pertains to the literature dealing with strate-
gic delegation and decentralized decision-making in competing hierarchies environments.
However, it departs from it in two important respects: asymmetric information and secret
contracting. First, the complete information literature on delegation has mainly focused
on the strategic value of delegating choices to agents in contexts where the vertical struc-
ture between a principal and his agent has no raison-d’eˆtre a priori (Chaim Fershtman
and Kenneth L. Judd, 1987, Chaim Fershtman, Kenneth L. Judd and Ehud Kalai, 1991,
Steven Sklivas, 1987, among many others). Instead, in our model the privileged access
of agents to information provides a rationale for the vertical structure in the first place.
To analyze the corresponding asymmetric information between manufacturers and retail-
ers, we follow Gal-Or (1991a), Martimort (1996) and Kai-Uwe Kuhn (1997) and consider
a broader contract space (namely menus of contracts) than the simple linear or piece-
wise contracts used so far in the complete information literature on strategic delegation.
Menus are flexible to fit different realizations of demand. Second, we focus on secret
contracts. The terms of trade specified in vertical contracts are secret and cannot be
used for strategic purposes; only the decision to use QF or RPM is public, an admittedly
weaker assumption. Under asymmetric information, choosing a QF contract induces more
information rent downstream but it has also a strategic value because more delegation
affects downstream competition.27
25A similar idea has been applied by Roberta Dessi (2007). She shows that, in a pure moral hazard
framework, incomplete contracts can be used as a foreclosure device via their signaling effects on entrants.
26Exceptions are Piccolo et al. (2008) and Martimort and Piccolo (2007), which however do not inves-
tigate when more incomplete contracts emerge spontaneously in a static game of competing hierarchies.
27See also Michael Katz (1991) and Bernard Caillaud, Bruno Jullien and Pierre Picard (1995) on the
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6 Concluding remarks
Focusing on a simple manufacturer-retailer model, we have shown that the equilibrium de-
terminants of the choice between QF and RPM rest upon two somewhat natural aspects of
information asymmetries: (i) the way different screening instruments shape agency costs;
(ii) the type of externalities that bilateral negotiations between manufacturer-retailer pairs
impose on competing vertical structures. The main result is that manufacturers dealing
with (exclusive) competing retailers, may prefer to leave contracts silent on some (po-
tentially) verifiable performance measures, namely price, whenever certain other aspects
of agents’ activity remain noncontractible. The key idea is that by allowing agents to
respond more efficiently to competition, QF has a strategic value in that it may induce
a more friendly behavior in the downstream competition. An interesting, and somewhat
wider lesson of this result is that competition, and especially the channels through which
it develops, can be an important source of contractual incompleteness.
7 Appendix
7.1 Market equilibrium under RPM
In this section we provide a formal characterization of the market equilibrium when S1
offers RPM. The next lemma summarizes the results.
Lemma 1 Assume that A1 holds.Then the following properties are satisfied:
• eP1 (θ) ≤ e∗1(θ) and qP1 (θ) ≤ q∗1(θ) for all θ (with equality holding only at θ)
• Information rents are increasing in θ and (6) holds.
Proof. We focus on linear equilibria where effort and quantities are linear in θ, that
is: qP1 (θ) = q
∗
1(θ) − q˙P1 (θ − θ) and eP1 (θ) = e∗1(θ) − e˙P1 (θ − θ) for all θ where q˙P1 and e˙P1
are two constants. From (2), qP2 (θ) is also linear in θ, q
P
2 (θ) = q
∗
2(θ¯) − q˙P2 (θ¯ − θ) with
q˙P2 =
1
2
(1 + ρq˙P1 + σe˙
P
1 ).
To find the value of q˙P1 and show that q˙
P
1 > 0 when A1 holds, we differentiate w.r.t.
θ equation (10) taking into the linearity of qP1 (θ) and e
P
1 (θ):
q˙P1 =
−2(q˙P1 − ψe˙P1 ) + ψ(2 + ρ(1 + σe˙P1 ))
ρ2ψ
. (17)
Using now (11) and differentiating w.r.t. θ to express e˙P1 as a function of q˙
P
1 , and
inserting into (17) yields:
q˙P1 =
2ψ(2 + ρ)
ψ (4− 2ρ (σ + ρ))− σρ− 2 . (18)
Therefore, q˙P1 > 0 when
ψ >
2 + σρ
4− 2ρ (σ + ρ)
strategic value of secret contracts in vertical relationships plagued with agency problems.
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which is guaranteed by A1.
By using the definition of q∗1(θ) we get:
q˙∗1 =
ψ(2 + ρ)
ψ (4− ρ2)− σρ− 2 > 0,
when A1 holds.
Now, since qP1 (θ)− q∗1(θ) = (q˙∗1 − q˙P1 )(θ − θ) for all θ, we get:
q˙P1 − q˙∗1 =
(2 + σρ) (2ψ − 1) (2 + ρ)ψ
(ψ (4− 2ρ (σ + ρ))− σρ− 2)(ψ (4− ρ2)− σρ− 2)
which immediately implies q˙∗1 < q˙
P
1 by A1. Hence q
P
1 (θ) ≤ q∗1(θ) for all θ with equality
only at θ.
By using the same kind of arguments, we have:
e˙P1 =
(2ψ + 1) (2 + ρ)
ψ (4− 2ρ (σ + ρ))− σρ− 2 .
Then, since ψe˙∗1 = q˙
∗
1, one gets:
e˙P1 − e˙∗1 =
2 (2 + ρ) (4− ρ2)ψ(2ψ − 1)
(ψ (4− 2ρ (σ + ρ))− σρ− 2)(ψ (4− ρ2)− σρ− 2) ,
implying e˙∗1 < e˙
P
1 by A1 and, since e
P
1 (θ¯) = e
∗
1(θ¯), e
P
1 (θ) ≤ e∗1(θ) for all θ ≤ θ¯.
Using the expressions above of q˙P1 and e˙
P
1 , we obtain:
1 + ρq˙P2 =
(2 + ρ)(2ψ − 1)
ψ (4− 2ρ (σ + ρ))− σρ− 2 > 0 (19)
when A1 holds.
Notice also that program (PP ′) displays interior non-negative solutions when θ is high
enough. Together with (19), this implies that the information rent UP1 (θ) is increasing as
was supposed since
0 < U˙P1 (θ) =
(2 + ρ) (2ψ − 1)ψeP1 (θ)
ψ (4− 2ρ (σ + ρ))− σρ− 2 .
Together with q˙P1 > 0, (19) also implies that the second-order conditions of the retailer
R1’s problem, namely (6), hold since
(q˙P1 (θ) + p˙
P
1 (θ))(1 + ρq˙
P
2 (θ)) = 2q˙
P
1 (1 + ρq˙
P
2 ) > 0. (20)
Finally, let UP1 (θ, θˆ) be R1’s profits when the true retailer’s type is θ but he announces
a message θˆ 6= θ to S1. To show that global incentive compatibility constraints hold we
must have ΓP (θ, θˆ) ≡ UP1 (θ, θ)− UP1 (θ, θˆ) ≥ 0 for each pair (θ, θˆ) ∈ Θ2. Simple algebraic
manipulations taking into account that pP1 (θ) = q
P
1 (θ) for all θ, allow to rewrite Γ
P (·)
as ΓP (θ, θˆ) =
∫ θ
θˆ
{
2q˙P1 (s)q
P
1 (s)− t˙P1 (s)− 2ψeP1 (s, θ)q˙P1 (s)
}
ds, where eP1 (s, θ) ≡ 2qP1 (s) −
ρqP2 (θ)− θ. By using (5) and substituting for t˙P1 (s) ≡ 2(qP1 (s)− ψeP1 (s))q˙P1 (s) into ΓP (·),
one obtains:
ΓP (θ, θˆ) = 2ψ
∫ θ
θˆ
q˙P1 (s)
{∫ θ
s
(1 + ρq˙P2 (x))dx
}
ds = ψq˙P1 (1 + ρq˙
P
2 )(θ − θˆ)2 ≥ 0 ∀(θ, θˆ).
where the last equality follows from the fact that the equilibrium is linear in types and
the final inequality follows from (20) which concludes the proof. 
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7.2 Market equilibrium under QF
We provide now a formal characterization of the market equilibrium when S1 offers a QF
contract. The next lemma summarizes the results.
Lemma 2 Assume that A1 holds.The following properties are satisfied:
• eQ1 (θ) ≤ e∗1(θ) and qQ1 (θ) ≤ q∗1(θ) for all θ (with equality only at θ);
• Information rents are increasing in θ and (13) holds.
Proof. As before, we focus on a linear equilibrium where qQ1 (θ) = q
∗
1(θ) − q˙Q1 (θ − θ)
for all θ. We still have also eQ1 (θ) and q
Q
2 (θ) linear, with q˙
Q
2 =
1
2
(1 + ρq˙Q1 + σe˙
Q
1 ), and
eQ1 (θ) = e
∗
1(θ) − e˙Q1 (θ − θ). However, we have now, ψeQ1 (θ) = qQ1 (θ) for all θ and thus
ψe˙Q1 = q˙
Q
1 .
Taking into account this linearity and differentiating (16) with respect to θ yields:
q˙Q1 =
−2(2 + ρ)ψ + ((4− ρ2)ψ − (2 + ρσ))q˙Q1
ρ (σ + ψρ)
.
Simplifying, we get:
q˙Q1 =
(2 + ρ)ψ
ψ (2− ρ2)− σρ− 1
with q˙Q1 > 0 when
ψ >
1 + σρ
2− ρ2
which follows from A1.
We then have qQ1 (θ)− q∗1(θ) = (q˙∗1 − q˙Q1 )(θ − θ) for all θ where:
q˙Q1 − q˙∗1 =
(2 + ρ)(2ψ − 1)ψ
(ψ (2− ρ2)− σρ− 1)(ψ (4− ρ2)− σρ− 2) ,
which immediately implies q˙∗1 < q˙
Q
1 by A1. Hence q
Q
1 (θ) ≤ q∗1(θ) for all θ with equality
only at θ.
Hence, we get e˙Q1 = q˙
Q
1 /ψ > q˙
∗
1/ψ = e˙
∗
1. Since e
Q
1 (θ¯) = e
∗
1(θ¯), this implies e
Q
1 (θ) ≤ e∗1(θ)
for all θ ≤ θ¯.
Using the expressions above of q˙Q1 and e˙
Q
1 , we obtain:
1 + ρq˙Q2 =
(2ψ − 1) (2 + ρ)
2(ψ (2− ρ2)− σρ− 1) > 0 (21)
when A1 holds.
Program (PQ′) displays positive interior solutions whenever θ is high enough. Hence,
for qQ1 (θ) being positive, (21) implies:
0 < U˙Q1 (θ) =
qQ1 (θ) (2ψ − 1) (2 + ρ)
2(ψ (2− ρ2)− σρ− 1) ,
so that UQ1 (·) is increasing in θ.
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Together with q˙
Q
1 > 0, (21) also implies that the second-order conditions of the retailer
R1’s problem, namely (13), hold since
q˙Q1 (θ)(1 + ρq˙
Q
2 (θ)) = q˙
Q
1 (1 + ρq˙
Q
2 ) > 0. (22)
Finally, let UQ1 (θ, θˆ) define the retailer’s profits when the true demand realization is
θ but he announces a message θˆ 6= θ to S1. To show that global incentive compatibility
constraints hold we must have ΓQ(θ, θˆ) ≡ UQ1 (θ, θ)−UQ1 (θ, θˆ) ≥ 0 for each pair (θ, θˆ) ∈ Θ2.
Simple algebraic manipulations allow to rewrite ΓQ(·) as:
ΓQ(θ, θˆ) =
∫ θ
θˆ
{
−t˙Q1 (s) + q˙Q1 (s)(p1(θ, eQ1 (s), qQ1 (s), qQ2 (θ))− qQ1 (s))
}
ds.
Using (12), we get t˙Q(s) ≡ q˙Q1 (s)(p1(s, eQ1 (s), qQ1 (s), qQ2 (s)) − qQ1 (s)). Inserting into the
above equation, we get:
ΓQ(θ, θˆ) =
∫ θ
θˆ
q˙Q1 (s)
{∫ θ
s
(1 + ρq˙Q2 (x))dx
}
ds = q˙Q1 (1 + ρq˙
Q
2 )
(θ − θˆ)2
2
≥ 0 ∀(θ, θˆ)
where the last equality follows from the fact that the equilibrium is linear in types and
the final inequality follows from (22) which concludes the proof. 
7.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Because of linearity and the fact that eQ1 (θ¯) = e
P
1 (θ¯), we have e
Q
1 (θ) − eP1 (θ) = (e˙P1 −
e˙Q1 )(θ − θ) for all θ. Using the definition of e˙P1 and e˙Q1 , A1 implies:
e˙P1 − e˙Q1 =
(2ψ − 1)(2 + ρ)(ψ(2− ρ2)− 1)
(2ψ (2− ρ (σ + ρ))− σρ− 2)(ψ (2− ρ2)− σρ− 1) > 0.
Since eQ(θ¯) = eP (θ¯), we have eQ(θ) ≥ eP (θ) for all θ with equality only at θ.
We have also qQ2 (θ)− qP2 (θ) = (q˙P2 − q˙Q2 )(θ − θ) for all θ, where:
q˙P2 − q˙Q2 =
σ (2 + ρ) (2ψ − 1)2
2(2ψ (2− ρ (σ + ρ))− σρ− 2)(ψ (2− ρ2)− σρ− 1) . (23)
Since qQ2 (θ¯) = q
P
2 (θ¯), it follows that sign(q
Q
2 (θ)− qP2 (θ)) =sign(σ) when A1 holds.
Similarly, we have:
q˙P1 − q˙Q1 =
σρ (2ψ − 1) (2 + ρ)ψ
(2ψ (2− ρ (σ + ρ))− σρ− 2)(ψ (2− ρ2)− σρ− 1) .
Finally, the facts that qQ1 (θ¯) = q
P
1 (θ¯) and that A1 holds ensure that sign(q
Q
1 (θ) −
qP1 (θ)) =sign(σρ). 
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7.4 Proof of Theorem 1
First, observe that with a uniform distribution one has Eθ[θ−θ] = ∆θ/2 and Eθ[θ−θ]2 =
∆θ2/3. Second, since the disutility function is quadratic, inverse demand is linear, and
equilibrium outputs and effort are linear, S1’s expected profit under both contractual
regimes will be quadratic in θ and can be expressed as:
Πω1 = Eθ[Π
ω
1 (θ)] = Π
ω
1 (θ)− Π˙ω1 (θ)Eθ[θ− θ] +
1
2
Π¨ω1 (θ)Eθ[θ− θ]2 for each ω ∈ {Q,P} (24)
where Πω1 (θ) is the type-contingent virtual profit in state θ when the optimal contract is
chosen in class ω. We have:
ΠP1 (θ) = (θ + e
P
1 (θ) + ρq
P
2 (θ)− qP1 (θ))qP1 (θ)− ψ
(
eP1 (θ)
)2
2
− (θ¯ − θ)(1 + ρq˙P2 )ψeP1 (θ)
and
ΠQ1 (θ) = (θ + e
Q
1 (θ) + ρq
Q
2 (θ)− qQ1 (θ))qQ1 (θ)− ψ
(eQ1 (θ))
2
2
− (θ¯ − θ)(1 + ρq˙Q2 )qQ1 (θ)
with ψeQ1 (θ) = q
Q
1 (θ).
Using (24) and taking expectations, we get:
ΠQ1 − ΠP1 = (Π˙P1 (θ)− Π˙Q1 (θ))
∆θ
2
+ (Π¨Q1 (θ)− Π¨P1 (θ))
∆θ2
6
, (25)
We need then to compute each term appearing in (25). First, consider program (PP ′),
differentiating with respect to θ the maximand and using the Envelope Theorem, we have:
Π˙P1 (θ) = (1 + ρq˙
P
2 )(ψe
P
1 (θ) + q
P
1 (θ))
and thus, since ψeP1 (θ¯) = q
P
1 (θ¯), we get Π˙
P
1 (θ) = 2q
∗
1(θ)(1 + ρq˙
P
2 ). Differentiating once
more the expression of Π˙P1 (θ) above w.r.t. θ and taking into account the linearity of e
P
1 (θ)
and qP1 (θ), we get Π¨
P
1 (θ) = (1 + ρq˙
P
2 )(q˙
P
1 + ψe˙
P
1 ).
Consider now program (PQ′), differentiating with respect to θ the maximand and using
the Envelope Theorem, we have:
Π˙Q1 (θ) = 2(1 + ρq˙
Q
2 )q
Q
1 (θ).
Therefore, we get Π˙Q1 (θ) = 2(1+ ρq˙
Q
2 )q
∗
1(θ). Differentiating once more w.r.t. θ and taking
into account the linearity of qQ1 (θ), we get Π¨
Q
1 (θ) = 2q˙
Q
1 (1 + ρq˙
Q
2 ) = (q˙
Q
1 + ψe˙
Q
1 )(1 + ρq˙
Q
2 ).
Substituting Π˙ω1 (θ) and Π¨
ω
1 (θ), for ω ∈ {Q,P}, into (25) yields:
ΠQ1 − ΠP1 = ρq∗1(θ)
(
q˙P2 − q˙Q2
)
∆θ −
(
(q˙P1 + ψe˙
P
1 )(1 + ρq˙
P
2 )− (q˙Q1 + ψe˙Q1 )(1 + ρq˙Q2 )
) ∆θ2
6
.
Taking ∆θ small enough and substituting (23) into the above equation we have up to
terms of order ∆θ2 when ρσ > 0:
ΠQ1 − ΠP1 ≈
σρq∗1(θ) (2ψ − 1) (2 + ρ)ψ∆θ
(2ψ (2− ρ (σ + ρ))− σρ− 2)(ψ (2− ρ2)− σρ− 1) ,
21
which immediately yields the result since ΠQ1 −ΠP1 > 0 whenever ρσ > 0, and ΠQ1 −ΠP1 < 0
whenever ρσ < 0.
To conclude the proof we must consider the case where σρ = 0. The first-order term
is now not enough to sign ΠQ1 − ΠP1 , hence we will use the second-order term of (25):
ΠQ1 − ΠP1 =
(
(q˙Q1 + ψe˙
Q
1 )(1 + ρq˙
Q
2 )− (q˙P1 + ψe˙P1 )(1 + ρq˙P2 )
) ∆θ2
6
.
First assume σ = 0, in this case q˙P1 = q˙
Q
1 and q˙
P
2 = q˙
Q
2 , and we have:
ΠQ1 − ΠP1 = −ψ(1 + ρq˙Q2 )(e˙P1 − e˙Q1 )
∆θ2
6
,
which yields the result since e˙P1 > e˙
Q
1 . The same kind of arguments shows that, when
ρ = 0,
ΠQ1 − ΠP1 = −ψ(e˙P1 − e˙Q1 )
∆θ2
6
< 0,
which concludes the proof. 
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